The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. 2026 INSC 92 addresses a question of considerable practical and doctrinal importance under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), i.e., which forum is competent to entertain an application under Section 29A for extension of the mandate of an arbitral tribunal. Divergent judicial pronouncements on this question had, over time, created uncertainty as to whether such applications lie before the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, or before the High Court that had appointed the arbitral tribunal under Section 11.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has now settled the position and stated that jurisdiction under Section 29A is governed by the statutory definition of “Court” contained in Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted by a High Court or by the Supreme Court in exercise of powers under Section 11.
The Statutory Scheme
The Act draws a careful distinction between different categories of court-facing functions. Section 2(1)(e) defines “Court” for purposes of Part I of the Act as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district and in cases where the subject matter of the arbitration is a subject matter of a suit, the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Section 11, by contrast, vests the power of appointment of arbitrators in the Supreme Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and not in the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e). Section 29A empowers the “Court” to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal, substitute an arbitrator, or impose terms as a condition of extension, where the award is not made within the period prescribed under the Act.
The question, therefore, was whether the reference to “Court” in Section 29A should be read as a term tied to Section 2(1)(e), or whether it should be understood, as a matter of institutional logic, to mean the same High Court that had exercised Section 11 power in relation to that arbitration.
The Conflict of Judicial Opinion
Two lines of authority had emerged on this question. One line held that Section 29A applications must, consistently with the definitional scheme of the Act, be filed before the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e).
A second line took the position that where a High Court had appointed the arbitral tribunal under Section 11, that High Court alone retained jurisdiction to extend the tribunal’s mandate or to substitute the arbitrator, on the reasoning that the appointing court continues to exercise a form of supervisory control over the arbitration it has constituted.
This divergence carried real consequences. It meant that identical applications, arising from materially similar facts, could be directed to entirely different fora depending on which High Court had exercised Section 11 jurisdiction. This frequently converted a procedural extension application into a contested question of forum.
The Hon’ble Court’s Reasoning
The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a court exercising Section 11 jurisdiction retains any continuing supervisory authority over the arbitral proceedings once the tribunal has been constituted. The Hon’ble Court held that the power under Section 11 is exhausted upon the appointment of the arbitral tribunal, and that no supervisory jurisdiction survives thereafter unless the Act expressly so provides. On this reasoning, Section 29A, which confers a distinct and independently defined jurisdiction on the “Court” under Section 2(1)(e), cannot be read as impliedly incorporating a continuing role for the appointing court.
The Hon’ble Court further held that considerations of curial hierarchy, or the institutional standing of the court that had exercised Section 11 power, are not a legitimate basis for locating jurisdiction. Jurisdiction under a statute is conferred by the statute and must be traced to its text; it cannot be enlarged, displaced, or reallocated by reference to convenience, comity or the perceived seniority of one court over another.
A secondary argument also advanced was that the filing of a Section 11 petition before a High Court attracts Section 42 of the Act, which provides that where an application under Part I has been made to a court, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of the arbitration agreement.
The Hon’ble Court rejected this argument on a plain reading of Section 42. The section applies only where the earlier application was made to a “Court” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e). Since a Section 11 petition is not an application before such a “Court” but is instead an application invoking a separate and independently sourced power of the Supreme Court or High Court, Section 42 is not attracted. A Section 11 petition therefore does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the appointing High Court in respect of subsequent applications, including those under Section 29A.
Significance of the Decision
The judgment is significant on several counts. First, it resolves a genuine conflict of judicial opinion and establishes a uniform rule of forum for Section 29A applications, to be determined by reference to Section 2(1)(e) alone.
Second, it reaffirms the principle, consistent with the Court’s earlier jurisprudence on the nature of Section 11 power, that the appointing court’s role is confined to constitution of the tribunal and does not translate into an ongoing supervisory jurisdiction absent express statutory authorization.
Third, the decision clarifies the limited operation of Section 42, confirming that it applies only to applications made before a “Court” as statutorily defined and does not extend to proceedings under Section 11.
Fourth, and more broadly, the judgment reinforces the discipline that judicial powers under the Act are creatures of statute, to be exercised strictly within the confines of the provision that confers them, rather than expanded through notions of institutional hierarchy or continuing control.
Conclusion
The judgment in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. settles the jurisdictional question under Section 29A of the Act by holding that applications for extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate must be filed before the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), regardless of the forum that appointed the arbitrator under Section 11.
In doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reaffirmed a structural principle central to the scheme of the Act, i.e., that judicial intervention in arbitration is confined to what the statute expressly permits and that the identity or seniority of the court exercising a particular power under the Act cannot itself be the source of jurisdiction. The decision brings clarity and consistency to Section 29A practice and is likely to be followed as settled law by High Courts across jurisdictions.